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Abstract 
 
Small start-up firms are the engine of job creation in early transition and 
yet little is known about the characteristics of this new sector. We seek to 
identify patterns of job growth in this sector in terms of niches left from 
central planning and ask about differences in job creation across two different 
transition economies: Estonia, which experienced rapid destruction of the pre-
existing firms, and the Czech Republic, which reduced the old sector 
gradually. We find job growth within industries to be quantitatively more 
important than job growth due to across-industry reallocation. Furthermore, 
the industrial composition of startups is strikingly similar in the two countries. 
We offer convergence to "western" industry firm-size distributions as an 
explanation. We also find regularities in wage evolution across new and old 
firms, including small differences in job quality across the two transition 
paths. 
 
JEL classification:  O1, O4, P2, P5, J2. 
 
Keywords: Job growth, job creation, job destruction, new sector, transition economies, 
Czech Republic, Estonia.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“Transition” of the productive structure in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and former Soviet Union is a process aimed at achieving efficiency through (1) 
restructuring of enterprises that were created during central planning (e.g., by 
privatization), and (2) reallocating capital and labor from these post-communist firms to 
new start-up private ones.
1 Much research within the transition literature has analyzed the 
process of privatization and whether it has resulted in efficiency-inducing restructuring (for 
surveys see Roland, 2000 and Svejnar, 1999, 2002). On the other hand, relatively little 
work has focused on new start-up firms, even though early in transition at least one 
important author, Kornai (1990), viewed the rise of the small new sector as more important 
for the success of transition than restructuring of the old state-owned firms. Only recently, 
has an empirical literature emerged that stresses the importance of the new start-up firms as 
the engine of growth in these economies (see, e.g., Berkowitz and DeJong, in press, and 
Mitra et al., 2001). Nevertheless, little remains known about the characteristics and 
evolution of this new sector.
2  
In this paper we analyze the growth of the new sector in two countries whose paths 
of transition have been very different: the Czech Republic and Estonia. Our earlier research 
(Jurajda and Terrell, 2001) demonstrated that the new sector was an impressive and sole 
engine of job creation in both countries at the start of transition: In only three to five years 
more jobs were provided by de novo (start-up) firms than by the firms inherited (and 
potentially transformed) from communism. This massive new-sector growth occurred on 
different policy backgrounds. While Estonian early transition was characterized by 
massive job destruction of the old firms in absence of an effective social security net, 
Czech reallocation proceeded at a more gradual pace, involved relatively generous social 
support, and featured extensive voluntary moves from the old firms to the new sector. 
In our previous work, we interpreted the aggregate job reallocation patterns in 
terms of macroeconomic theories. In the present analysis we focus on micro-economic 
                                                 
1 For a similar view on adjustment in developing countries see Caballero and Hammour (1996). 
2 While there is extensive research on the reallocation of labor across industrial branches (see Boeri and 
Terrell, 2002, for a summary), as well as work focusing on patterns of private employment, for the most part 
this literature uses data that do not differentiate between privatized and de novo private firms. This is crucial 
to the extent that privatized firms did not effectively restructure, which is especially likely in the Czech 
Republic (see, e.g., Roland, 2000).  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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aspects of the new-to-old reallocation. We ask to what extent these new firms are shaping 
the economies into more mature market economies, both in terms of industrial and firm-
size structure. We expect new-sector job growth to be strongest in industries under-staffed 
under central planning. To the extent allowed by data, we also ask about the productivity 
of the new jobs and hence about their contribution to economic growth of these economies. 
Our previous macroeconomic comparison of the gradual Czech and rapid Estonian 
transition paths found similar levels of aggregate job creation on the background of 
dramatically different levels of job destruction and social safety nets. The second line of 
questioning in this paper naturally asks if these paths led to the creation of different types 
of jobs in the new sector.  One may expect the Estonian new sector to be creating fewer 
jobs in the more capital intensive sectors given the relative scarcity of capital in this 
country compared to the Czech Republic (see Section 2.1). It would also seem that the 
quality of jobs created within an environment of high incidence of unemployment and low 
benefits would be lower compared to that of jobs created in an environment of low 
unemployment and adequate benefits. Hence, it is interesting to ask to what degree the new 
sector served as a depository for unemployed, especially in Estonia. Finally, since much of 
the Czech reallocation occurred as a result of voluntary worker moves from old to new 
firms while most of the Estonian reallocation resulted from involuntary mobility, we 
expect higher new-old wage differentials in the Czech Republic than in Estonia. Similarly, 
the demographic composition of the new sector may be expected to be different under the 
more voluntary reallocation, with a larger fraction of young workers who can better reap 
benefits from investing into new skills required in start-up enterprises. 
The relative lack of research on new firms is likely caused by the fact that micro 
data sets on early-transition evolution of employment by the new/old distinction are scarce. 
Our findings are based on labor market histories from retrospective household survey data 
which allow one to distinguish old vs. new firms as opposed to distinguishing private 
(including privatized) vs. state-owned. An important advantage is that the data are 
representative samples of population in both countries, and hence cover employment in all 
industries (not just manufacturing) and firm sizes.  
The paper proceeds in Section 2 with some background on the transition experience 
of our two sample economies and with a discussion of the existing literature. In Section 3 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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we introduce our data and empirical strategy. The findings are presented in Section 4; 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Background and Previous Literature  
 
2.1 The Transition of the Czech Republic and Estonia  
A decade after the start of the transition, the Czech Republic and Estonia are two of the 
most market-oriented economies in the region. The Czech Republic became free of Soviet 
rule at the end of 1989 and undertook its first macroeconomic and institutional reforms in 
1991 whereas Estonia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and enacted a 
reform package, similar to the Czech one, in 1992.
3 
However, Estonia experienced a deeper and longer recession than the Czech 
Republic.
4 Whereas the unemployment rate in the Czech Republic peaked at 4.1 percent 
during the year of price liberalization (1991) and then stabilized at around 3 percent until 
1996 (five years after the start of transition), the unemployment rate in Estonia continued 
to rise throughout the entire period, reaching almost 10 percent in 1996. According to 
official statistics, by 1996, the end of our period of study, employment levels in Estonia 
were 77 percent of their 1989 levels and Czech employment was at 93 percent its 1989 
level. The Estonians also faced far higher levels of inflation throughout the entire period, 
but especially in its year of price liberalization when the country suffered Ruble 
hyperinflation of 1,076 percent. The government responded to runaway inflation by 
aggressively implementing tight monetary and fiscal policy and introduced a currency 
board for the newly established Estonian currency (crown) in July, 1992 (Eamets, 2001).  
Finally, real wage declined more in Estonia than in the Czech Republic during the 
hyperinflation year, but followed a very similar pattern once the new Estonian currency 
was introduced.  
The privatization process proceeded somewhat more rapidly in Estonia than in the 
Czech Republic (Kotrba and Svejnar, 1994; Eamets and Philips, 1998). There is extensive 
evidence on the Czech privatization suggesting little success in implied restructuring (see, 
                                                 
3 For more detail, see Dyba and Svejnar (1995) and Eamets (2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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e.g., the survey in Roland, 2000). On the other hand, little information is available on the 
amount of credit available for the start-up firms.  There are no official statistics on the 
share of bank credit going to small new firms in either country, yet the national statistics 
do indicate that there was more overall credit available in the Czech Republic than in 
Estonia. Our calculations indicate that total credit available as a percentage of GDP was 
about 66-69 percent in the Czech Republic (1991-94) whereas it was only 14-17 percent in 
Estonia (1994-95).  More importantly, new credit was about 10-12 percent of GDP in the 
Czech Republic (in 1993-94) whereas it was only 2 percent in Estonia (1994-95).  Survey 
evidence from Central European countries suggests that their credit markets have provided 
de novo private firms with large amounts of financing from early stages of firm existence 
and that credit for newly established firms has been more available in the Czech Republic 
than elsewhere  (Bratkowski et. al, 1999).  We also know that the relative share of GDP 
allocated to active labor market policies, another source of financing for startup firms, was 
lower in Estonia than in the Czech Republic (0.19 percent vs. 0.08 percent during the 
1990s, see Riboud et. al, 2001). 
Finally, we note that in spite of the deeper recession in Estonia its social safety net 
was substantially less generous than in the Czech Republic. In the first year of transition, 
the unemployed Czechs were offered 12 months of unemployment benefits entitlement and 
benefits as high as 90% of the previous wage. As the transition proceeded the Czechs 
tightened their unemployment benefit system, reducing the entitlement period to six 
months and lowering the replacement rate to between 50-60% of the previous wage.   
Whereas an Estonian unemployed worker also received benefits for six months, the 
replacement rate was only 7-10%. Finally, after six months of unemployment benefits, all 
poor Czech households are entitled to welfare benefits indefinitely, whereas only the poor 
Estonian families with three or more children are entitled to welfare assistance and for only 
up to three months. 
 
2.2 Previous Literature 
                                                                                                                                                    
4 The comparison of Estonia and the Czech Republic is essentially comparing the former Soviet Union with 
the CEE in all the above respects (except for the low level of the unemployment rate in the Czech Republic). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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The firm-based analysis of job creation and destruction in transition pointed out the 
dominant role of small new firms in job creation and large old firms in job destruction (e.g. 
Bilsen and Konings, 1998; Johnson, et al., 2000). However, this research had to rely on 
small samples of firm survey data.
5 The data scarcity is reflected in the little detailed 
analysis performed to-date about the growth of the de novo sector, its determinants and the 
impact of this sector on the economy.
6   
The available evidence suggests that entrepreneurial activity is a critical source of 
growth in post-socialist countries. Berkowitz and DeJong (in press) find that the number of 
startup firms across Russian regions exhibits a strong and enduring relationship with GDP 
growth rates. McMillan and Woodruff (2001) review studies of China, Poland, Russia and 
Vietnam and conclude that the robust economic growth enjoyed by Poland and China is 
attributable in large part to substantial entrepreneurial development they have enjoyed, 
while the economic stagnation Russia has endured during its transition is largely due to 
sluggish entrepreneurial development.  
In this paper we use worker-level data to analyze job reallocation. Two other 
studies use worker data to examine job creation and destruction in Estonia and the Czech 
Republic.  Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (1999) provide an extensive analysis of Estonia, 
using the same data we use.  Among other things, they study job creation and destruction 
in the public and private sectors, where the latter combines jobs in the privatized sector 
with those in de novo firms. Here we explicitly focus on startups (new sector) and 
aggregate privatized sector jobs with the remaining state owned enterprises (old sector). 
Jobs in the public sector (education, health, public administration) are partitioned out and 
not the focus of our study. In our earlier paper, Jurajda and Terrell (2001), we use the same 
new/old definitions to relate the degree and timing of aggregate job reallocation to 
macroeconomic theory. 
Finally, since we also examine wage differentials between old and new sector jobs 
in this paper, we should point out that there is a small literature that focuses on wage gains 
                                                 
5 There are representative studies of self-employment, however. See for example, Earle and Sakova (2000). 
6 Bratkowski et. al (1999) are one exception. They offer survey evidence from three Central European 
countries implying that their credit markets provide de novo private firms with large amounts of financing 
from early stages of firm existence and that credit for newly established firms is more available in the Czech 
Republic than in Hungary and Poland. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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of individuals who change jobs in transition economies.
7 This research sheds light on the 
nature of labor reallocation to the extent that wage gains reflect productivity gains. 
However, except for Munich et al. (2001), which uses the same Czech data that we use in this 
paper, none of these studies examines wage changes associated with the emerging new 
private sector. Munich et al. (2001) study wage growth of a panel of individuals who were 
employed in both 1989 and 1996 in the Czech Republic, to test competing predictions 
about the relationship between job and wage mobility, taking into account the decision of 
workers to quit or stay and to move to firms in the new versus old sector of the economy. 
The findings suggest that those who quit an old sector job for new one had the highest 
wage gains, and those who were laid off and went to another old sector had the lowest 
gains.  
 
3. Data and Measurement Issues 
 
Measuring the dynamics of worker and job reallocation into the de novo private sector at 
the beginning of the transition from communism to capitalism is not easy for two reasons. 
First, most of the startups are small firms (see Jurajda and Terrell, 2001) and the statistical 
offices did not include firms with fewer than 20 workers in their firm surveys.  Moreover, 
the offices were unable to locate many of the newly established firms with more than 20 
employees.
  Second, most of the existing household survey data does not differentiate 
between new private and privatized firms.  Furthermore, the household labor force surveys 
started being implemented in these countries only in the mid-1990s, leaving the first 
crucial years of transition uncovered.  
Hence, the only way to gather representative information on the entire population 
of firms during the early period of transition is to collect retrospective data from 
households, asking individuals about employer attributes.
8 In this section we briefly 
describe these data and show how measures of job reallocation, which are similar and 
complementary to those based on firm level data, can be constructed with individual data.  
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Boeri and Flinn (1997), Burda and Mertens (1998), Hunt (1998), Munich et al. (2001), Noorkôiv, 
et al. (1998) and Sabirianova (2000).  
8 On could also collect firm-level surveys today with retrospective questions about employment, but such 
sampling would not cover new firms started in early transition that went out of business, which would lead to 
underestimating the size of the new sector.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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We refer the reader to Jurajda and Terrell (2001) for a more detailed description of the data 
and these measures. 
 
 
 
3.1 Data 
Our analysis uses data from two similar retrospective surveys.  The Czech survey was 
administered in December 1996 to 3,157 randomly selected households throughout the 
Czech Republic using the sample frame of the official Labor Force Survey.  We have the 
employment histories of 4,786 individuals, who experience 7,926 main jobs during the 
1991-1996 period.
9 The Estonian survey was administered in the first quarter of 1995 to 
one percent of the population between the ages of 16 and 75 in 1995.  In Estonia, we have 
usable data on 7,928 individuals with at least one spell of employment during 1989-1995; 
in total they experience 14,465 main jobs.  The number of jobs per person in the data is 
therefore quite low at 1.82 in Estonia and 1.65 in the Czech Republic. 
For each job there is information on the industry of employment, type of 
employment and a number of employer attributes. For those that exited their employment, 
we also observe the reason for separation. Whereas in both countries there is information 
on the respondents' wage at the beginning and end of each job, in Estonia respondents were 
also asked to report their earnings in October of each year. However, wage information 
from the hyperinflation years of 1990-1991 is not usable.
10 
Retrospective data is often criticized for "recall bias." Research indicates that 
individuals recall traumatic events more readily and we believe that changes in the labor 
market status (rare at 1.7 to 1.8 jobs per person during six years) are likely to have been 
particularly memorable in an economy transiting from a system with many years of steady 
employment.
11 
                                                 
9 We have compared the means and distributions of the major demographic characteristics (i.e., age structure, 
gender, region of residence and household size) of our sample in 1996 with those from the national Labor 
Force Survey and we find that our sample is representative in terms of these characteristics. See Munich, 
Svejnar and Terrell (1997) for a description of the survey and sample design as well as the descriptive 
statistics of the sample relative to the LFS data.   
10 To form complete monthly labor market histories, we interpolate wages from the available information.  
11 For Estonia, Noorkoiv et al. (1997) compared the responses on economic activity in 1989 in the 1995 
survey with the responses in the 1989 census and found that "the recall data corresponded quite well. The 
majority of the discrepancies are attributable to changes in labor force definitions."   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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How do we classify firms into the “old” and the “new” sectors? Given the evidence 
on the lack of restructuring in the privatized firms in the Czech Republic (Roland, 2000), 
we would like to pool state and privatized jobs into the old sector and distinguish the de 
novo private enterprises (new sector) from the privatized firms.
  Whereas the Czech data 
allow us to make these distinctions,
12 in the Estonian questionnaire, firm ownership is 
categorized as state, private, or cooperative/collective. For jobs starting during our sample 
period the data do not distinguish jobs in a de novo private firm from those starting in 
privatized enterprises. Given that Estonian privatization is considered more efficient than 
that of the Czech Republic in terms of restructuring, we categorize jobs starting in a private 
firm as new-sector jobs and we keep ongoing jobs in privatized firms in the old sector. 
Following this strategy, the observed growth of the new sector will not be due to 
reclassification of ongoing jobs. Our choice maximizes comparability across the two 
countries given the structure of the data and the relative success of Estonian privatization 
in restructuring.
13 
In the end, we therefore distinguish between three main employment sectors: the 
old sector (comprised of jobs in the state owned enterprises, cooperatives, and privatized 
firms), the new sector (including all jobs in de novo private firms and the self-employed as 
well as jobs of new hires into Estonian privatized firms), and the public sector (public 
administration, health and education). Our firm-type assumptions carefully mimic the 
theoretical concepts and fit the available facts from the transition economies. As 
demonstrated in Jurajda and Terrell (2001), they also provide a very powerful way of 
slicing up the data. 
 
3.2  Measurement of Job and Worker Reallocation Rates 
Although job destruction and job creation are traditionally measured with firm data, they 
                                                 
12 Respondents are asked about the ownership type of their employer at the end of their employment spell. 
The choices are, e.g., "newly established private firm," "firm after privatization," "firm in privatization." This 
is not a perfect measure of ownership. In particular, it is unclear how the respondents consider spin-offs from 
privatized or state-owned firms. Yet, as we argue above it is the best measure available. 
13 It is not possible to gain full comparability of the new-sector definition across the Czech and Estonian data. 
However, we have compared the implied Estonian employment evolution to simulations based on realistic 
assumptions about the hiring rates of de novo and privatized firms and concluded that the differences at the 
aggregate level are minor. These results are available upon request. An alternative strategy is to also William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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can also be measured from worker flow data using information on type of employment 
separation.
14   In the Czech (Estonian) questionnaire, we have 13 (21) answers for how 
someone separated from their job. We define job destruction (JD) as any separations 
where: 1) the firm was closed down (by the respondent or another employer) and 2) the 
separation was part of a mass-layoff. The JD rate is the total number of job destructions at 
a given time t, divided by the number of jobs in t-1. Clearly some separations not included 
in these two types (e.g., retirement or quit without replacement) also correspond to job 
destruction; hence, our JD measure is likely to be a lower bound estimate. 
To measure job creation, we follow the existing literature and use the simple 
identity that net employment growth is the difference between job creation and job 
destruction. This implies that JCtk = ∆Etk + JDtk, where, ∆Etk denotes the time change in 
employment in sector k, and where JCtk and JDtk are job creation and job destruction counts 
in sector k in time t respectively.
15  
Again, this may be considered as a lower bound estimate for JC because JD may be 
underestimated. In particular, when the estimated JCtk measure is negative, it informs us 
that the minimum number of quits not replaced is -JCtk . Hence, whenever the initial JCtk 
estimate based on layoffs without replacement is negative we add the negative of JCtk to 
our JDtk measure and set JCtk at zero.
16  
Our measure produces the same net job creation as that based on firm data but it 
results in a measure of gross job flows that is not identical to that of the firm-level studies. 
Yet, our worker-level data offer important advantages. In particular, unlike data sets used 
in the empirical literature on job creation and destruction in transition, our data are based 
on well-defined random sampling, covers all economic activities and all firm sizes in the 
                                                                                                                                                    
reclassify jobs in privatized firms as new. See Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (1999) for an analysis of the 
Estonian data that relies on such private/state coding, which is, however, not available in the Czech data. 
14 See Davis and Haltiwanger (2000, pp. 2716-7) for the standard definitions of job creation and job 
destruction using firm level data. See Blanchard and Diamond (1990) for the development of comparable 
measures using worker level data.   
15 This strategy of estimating job creation and job destruction rates relies on random sampling. When we 
observe a layoff with replacement (not mass layoff) within a given employment category, it is expected to be 
compensated by hiring of another worker within our sample into this employment category. Layoffs with 
replacement constitute only about 2% (3-6.7%) of all Czech (Estonian) separations. 
16 In our final empirical work, we perform this correction at a more detailed level, checking for JCtks<0 where 
s denotes one-digit industry and summing up the corrected JDtks across industries within employment sectors 
k to obtain our final estimate of JDtk. This additional level of detail changes the corrected JD measure only in 
the old sector, which comes as no surprise.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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economy and provides a continuous coverage of transition.
17 Many studies on transition 
countries use small unrepresentative samples of firms or they focus on one industry only. 
Furthermore, these data often suffer from “survival bias” as the firm samples are typically 
collected only during mid-transition and therefore include only surviving firms. Survival 
bias may not only affect state-owned enterprises, but can come from the closure of newly 
established private businesses during (chaotic) early transition. This “survival bias” can 
lead to underestimation of the job destruction rates and is not present in our data.  
Perhaps most important is the fact that the firm-level approach is not available for 
medium and large firms during the early years of transition when Czech unemployment 
diverged from the rest of the CEE countries and little firm-level information exists for 
small firms in all years. Thus relying on firm data alone would ignore potentially important 
evidence that one can find using our approach. Our data also allow us to simultaneously 
consider worker and job flows and our measure of job reallocation captures within firm 
restructuring, which is not discernible with firm level data. Firm level data contain only the 
changes in total firm (plant) employment. If firms in a given sector maintain constant 
employment, but lay off and hire an equal number of workers (into different positions), 
such restructuring would be ignored in a firm-level data set, but is captured in our data.  
 
4.  Results 
 
Figure 1 sets the aggregate stage for our inquiry about the nature of job creation in early 
Czech and Estonian transition. Its two left quadrants summarize the employment 
reallocation across our three main sectors in each country while the right two graphs show 
the evolution of job creation and destruction. We recast time in terms of the start of the 
reforms; year 0 corresponds to 1991 for the Czech Republic and 1992 for Estonia.  
Two major patterns may be observed.  First, the growth of the new sector is striking 
in both countries: As seen by their shares of employment (NEW and OLD), the start-up 
firms provide more jobs than the old firms three to five years into the transition process.  
The rate of new sector growth in Estonia surpasses that in the Czech Republic. (We note 
that the size of these firms is relatively small: 85 to 90 percent of all jobs in the new sector 
                                                 
17 The issue of observing firms of even very small size turns out to be particularly important for the Czech 
transition. See Jurajda and Terrell (2001) for details. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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during the first few years of transition is located in firms employing less than 100 
workers.) Second, the reallocation in Estonia occurs on the background of drastic job 
destruction in the old sector (JD OLD) and falling employment (TOT) compared to gradual 
job destruction and rising employment in the voluntary-move driven Czech transition.
18 
(We ignore job creation in the old sector and job destruction in the new sector given their 
negligible size during early transition. See Jurajda and Terrell, 2001).  
We proceed to explore the characteristics of this new sector’s growth. There are 
some characteristics we would expect in all transition economies as they become market 
oriented.  Specifically, we would expect that the new sector creates relatively more jobs in 
industries (economic activities) that represent greater employment and output shares of 
market economies compared to planned economies (e.g., trade, restaurants and hotels, 
financial and other services). We would expect that the creation of these new jobs is 
strongly related to economic growth.  Given the disproportionately large firm-size 
structure in central planning, we expect the new job creation process lead to convergence 
in firm-size structures to that of the more mature market economies.  
In addition to these patterns for transition countries in general, we also expect 
differences in the evolution of the new sector and its characteristics in Estonia and the 
Czech Republic because of their different patterns of job destruction and relative levels of 
unemployment and social safety nets.  In particular, we would expect a larger share of job 
matches in Estonia to be of poor quality, and perhaps simply a repository for the 
unemployed.  The new-to-old sector wage difference should be lower in Estonia than in the 
Czech Republic, where a higher share of the transitions from old to new was voluntary. For 
the same reason, one would expect the workers in the Czech new sector to be markedly 
younger and more educated than the workers in the Czech old sector, whereas in Estonia 
there would be less of a difference in the characteristics of workers in the new and old 
sectors. In the following five sections, we gather evidence on each of these expectations. 
 
4.1 Industrial Reallocation 
This section provides new evidence on the industrial distribution of job reallocation in 
                                                 
18 Job creation in the new sector (JC NEW) and job destruction in the old sector (JD OLD) are plotted as a 
share of total employment in each country. TOT is the level of total employment at time t relative to 
employment at t=0. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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early transition.
19 We start in Figure 2 with estimates of the annual industry-specific job 
creation and job destruction rates (as a fraction of industry employment) for eight 
industrial branches.
20 In our previous paper (Jurajda and Terrell, 2001) we show that all of 
job creation (at the aggregate level) occurs in the new sector while job destruction is 
concentrated in the old sector in both economies. Hence, in what follows we do not need to 
differentiate between the new and old sectors in our presentation of industry job 
reallocation rates. 
We find in all industries there is a higher level of job reallocation (JC + JD) in 
Estonia than in the Czech Republic. This is because of both higher JC and higher JD in 
Estonia (JD being especially high in Estonian Agriculture, but also, e.g., in Trade, which 
enjoys also very high JC). The time pattern of JC is different across the two economies in 
some of the industries. In all branches of the Czech economy and in half of the Estonian 
industries, JC peaks in one or two years after the start of transition. On the other hand 
Estonian JC continues to climb at the end of our sampling frame in Manufacturing, 
Construction, Other Services, and Finance.
21 Overall, the patterns of JC and JD are very 
different across industries and across the two countries for a given industry, indicating very 
different processes. However, it is true that for all but few cases, the national pattern of JD 
or JC dominance (i.e., JD>JC in Estonia and JC>JD in the Czech Republic) prevails within 
each industry as well. 
What is the result of these industry job flows in terms of sectoral reallocation of 
employment? Each graph of Figure 3 shows the evolution of two indicators for each of our 
eight grouped industrial branches in the Czech Republic and Estonia. We plot the total 
employment in each industry as an index of its level at the start of transition (SIZE) to 
highlight growing and declining industries and juxtapose to this the share of start-up 
employment in all jobs within the industry (NEW) to see where “new employment” is 
growing most rapidly. 
The patterns of industry employment (SIZE) during transition are well known and 
it is not surprising to see agricultural employment as well as employment in 
                                                 
19 Here our individual-data analysis complements firm-level work of Faggio and Konings (2001) based on 
medium and large firms. Our evidence is also complementary to the extensive work on worker reallocation 
across industrial branches (see Boeri and Terrell, 2002, for a summary). 
20 The public sector (education, health, and public administration) is excluded from the analysis. 
21 The JC rate in the small Estonian Finance industry in year 2 is over 0.7 and would not fit on our graphs. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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manufacturing, decline, while employment of trade and finance industries grows. The 
largest decline within each country is in agriculture, with its employment falling almost 40 
percent in both countries when compared to the start of transition. On the other hand, 
(wholesale and retail) trade and finance showed the largest gain in each country.
22 Overall, 
transition leads to a convergence in the industrial structure of employment to that typical 
for mature market economies.  
We expected that new firms would contribute to this convergence and indeed they 
constitute a large share of the growing new economic activities (see NEW). Only three 
years into transition, over 70 percent of employment in trade and over 50 percent in 
construction and restaurant industries is in startup firms in both countries.  
However, Figure 3 indicates that startups grow in importance not only in 
expanding, but also in declining industries. By the end of 1995 (Czech t=4, Estonian t=3) 
new firms provide over a third of all jobs within both manufacturing and service industries 
in each country, despite the misallocation across those two industry groups at the outset of 
transition. While manufacturing was over-staffed under central planning and shrank during 
transition, the number of new manufacturing jobs is comparable to the number of new jobs 
in the rapidly expanding trade industries in both the Czech Republic and Estonia. 
This finding leads us to quantitatively compare new job growth across industries 
with new job growth within industries. How can we categorize new jobs as due to across as 
opposed to within industry reallocation? Obviously, a part of the new job growth 
corresponds to expansion of industries under-staffed under central planning. In industries 
that are shrinking, however, all of new sector growth is due to within-industry job 
reallocation. (Reduction of employment in a given industry could have been achieved by 
scrapping of old jobs alone without any growth of new firms.) In growing industries, 
within-sector reallocation amounts to that part of new-sector job growth that replaces 
disappearing old-sector jobs. The remaining part of new sector's growth in growing 
industries is attributable to across-industry reallocation. 
We compare the start of transition (year 0) with transition year 3 in both countries 
and calculate the size of both "within" and "across" job growth. In the Czech Republic and 
Estonia the sum of within-industry new-sector job growth amounts to 18% and 21% of the 
                                                 
22 There are also sizeable cross-country differences in industry employment evolution, for example services William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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total employment at the start of transition, respectively. In contrast, summing up the new-
sector job growth in growing industries net of the replacement of old-sector jobs there 
gives 12% for the Czech Republic and 5% for Estonia. In both countries, within-industry 
startup job growth is quantitatively more important than increases in employment (in new 
firms) across industries.
23   
Finally, Figure 3 is surprising not only because of the large growth of new jobs 
within declining industries, but also because of the similarity in the share of new 
employment across countries. Even though Estonian and Czech transition followed a 
different policy path, reflected in different pattern of job creation and destruction and 
different evolution of total employment (Figure 2), the share of new jobs within industries 
in Figure 3 is remarkably analogous. This holds true even for industries which grew in one 
country and shrank in another (e.g., construction).
24  
 
4. 2 Firm-size Reallocation 
Why is it that new jobs are created not only in the niches left open by central planning (e.g. 
in services) but within all branches of the economy? And why is it that the share of new 
jobs on industry employment is so similar across two different macroeconomic scenarios? 
It is a well-known fact that one of the main distortions of central planning was to do away 
with small firms. Given that almost all new job creation occurs in small firms, one natural 
interpretation of these reallocation patterns is that they are driven by convergence to 
"normal" industry-specific firm-size distribution.  
While different open economies specialize in different industries given their 
comparative advantage, it is more natural to expect the firm-size distribution within an 
industry to be similar across countries. For example, Kumar, et al. (1999) analyze 
European data on average firm size by country and industry and find that 63% of variation 
in firm size is attributable to industry identity and only 2.5% to country identity. This 
finding is confirmed in the top panel of Table 1, which provides a summary of the firm-
size distribution over broad groups of industries from Austria in 1998 and each part of 
                                                                                                                                                    
grow faster and manufacturing falls slower during Czech transition. 
23 The total across-industry job destruction of old jobs over this 4-year period, which equals the sum of job 
losses of declining industries, is 18% in Estonia and only 5% in the Czech Republic. 
24 The only difference is the particularly severe decline of old firms in some Estonian industries (agriculture 
and manufacturing), resulting in the faster growth of the share of the new sector there. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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Germany in 1995. Indeed, comparing the fraction of workers employed in firms in the 
upper two categories (the lower two are not always strictly comparable) suggests a striking 
similarity of firm size distribution in Austria and West Germany.
25 These distributions 
provide one possible benchmark against which one can measure the transition reallocation.  
The bottom four panels of Table 1 contains industry firm-size distributions in the 
Czech Republic and Estonia at the start of transition and then again in mid transition. The 
initial distortion towards large firms is clear, especially in manufacturing, construction, and 
services. It is also equally clear that there was a substantial shift toward western 
distributions and this shift roughly "explains" the growth of the share of the new-sector 
employment within each industry. Correlating the share of the new sector on an industry 
employment in the Czech Republic with the corresponding employment share of firms 
with less than 100 workers across our 8 industries (from Section 4.1) in December 1996 
results in a correlation of 0.93. For Estonia this correlation from March 1995 is lower, at 
0.76, reflecting the bigger role for large new firms in Estonia compared to Czech Republic 
(see Jurajda and Terrell, 2001).  
 
4. 3 Demographic Reallocation 
Given the differences in the transition path of our two countries, it is natural to ask whether 
there are differences in the demographic composition of the sectoral reallocation. In Figure 
4 we plot the share that each demographic group (in terms of gender, age, and education) 
represents out of total employment (SHARE) and the fraction that new sector jobs 
represent out of all jobs for each demographic group (NEW).  The remarkable finding is 
the similarity in patterns across the two countries. The young, the more educated and males 
are progressively getting the new jobs in transition. Despite the different job destruction 
policies, the different time pattern of job creation in the new sector, or the differences in 
cross-industry flows, the demographic composition of the new-old reallocation is virtually 
identical. Again, as with the share of the new sector on industries' employment, there are 
striking similarities in the transition process for two countries at different level of 
development, facing different extent of misallocation and different macroeconomic shocks. 
                                                 
25 The statistics are based on representative samples of social security records excluding the public sector. 
See Bender et al. (2000) and Stiglbauer et al. (2002) for descriptions of the German and Austrian data 
respectively. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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4.4 "Quality" of New Jobs 
We are interested in the productivity of the new jobs and its potential difference across our 
two countries. However, we do not have data on productivity and so we use two indirect 
approaches to learn about it.  First, the industry estimates of job reallocation allow us to 
ask about the relationship between the growth of startups and GDP growth. Here, we draw 
on Berkowitz and DeJong (in press) who correlate across Russian regions the GDP growth 
and the number of small-scale enterprises—a measure similar to our JC rate in the new 
sector. They find a strong positive correlation between the number of small enterprises and 
growth using an OLS regression. Furthermore, they are able to instrument for the number 
of small enterprises and their two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimate confirms the OLS 
effect.
26   
While we construct estimates of Estonian annual job creation for a number of 
industries from 1992 till 1994, Estonian GDP level by industry is only available since 
1993, allowing us to only work with GDP growth and JC rates from 1994 (transition year 
2). These data are plotted in Figure 5a, which indicates a strong positive correlation 
between job reallocation and GDP growth.
27 Next, we compare the Estonian graph with the 
relationship between GDP growth and JC rates in the Czech transition year 2. Figure 5b 
again suggests a positive correlation, which is even higher than in Estonia during the same 
year of transition.
28 While the dispersion in JC rates is similar across countries, the 
variation in Czech industry GDP growth rates is much wider.
29 Of course, these are not 
causal relationships as both JC rate and GDP growth rate can be higher in an industry hit 
by a positive shock. However, Berkowitz and DeJong (in press) suggest that at least in 
Russia, the OLS effects are similar to those of 2SLS.
30  
                                                 
26 They exclude regional education levels, initial income, reformist voting, and privatization indicators and 
they successfully test these restrictions. Their first-stage regression attains a high R
2 of 0.82.  
27 We excluded Estonian finance due to an imprecise JC estimate. We always exclude the public sector.  
28 Czech 1993 GDP growth rates are available for 8 grouped industries: (1) Agriculture, (2) Manufacturing, 
Mining and Utilities, (3) Construction, (4) Trade, Restaurant and Hotel, (5) Transport and Communication, 
(6) Finance, (7) Business Services, and (8) Other Personal Services. We exclude (1) as an outlier. 
29 When we run OLS regressions of industry-specific GDP growth in year 2 on both JD and JC rates, the JC 
rate coefficient is significant in both countries and larger in the Czech Republic (1.60 as opposed to 0.62). 
The JD rate coefficient is negative and similar across countries (-0.73 and -0.56 for Czech and Estonian 
regression respectively), although only statistically significant in Estonia. 
30 To control for industry-specific time-constant shocks we use the time dimension of our Czech data and 
estimate an OLS regression of GDP growth rates across our 7 industries in 1993 and 1996 on the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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Another way to evaluate the increases in productivity from the new sector jobs is to 
calculate the total wage bill by sector. This measure re-weights aggregate employment 
counts of Figure 1 in terms of the "effective" output and captures employment losses as 
well as gains. Weighting employment by wages increases the speed of Czech new-sector 
growth: a higher total wage bill is paid out in start-up firms in mid 1994, whereas higher 
employment was only achieved in 1996. Using the wage-bill measure, the Estonian new 
sector again rises as in the Czech Republic, but the old sector does not loose much of its 
1993 position so that the intersection of old and new wage bills occurs by the end of 1995 
– similar to the simple employment counts. Hence, our data imply that the wage bill paid 
out in the new firms surpasses the old-sector wage bill by about 3 to 4 years into reform 
under both transition regimes.
31 
In both countries, we find a strong positive correlation between JC rates and GDP 
growth and a similar increase of the new-sector wage bill. Still, one might suspect that 
some of the job creation in Estonia is of low quality. Job creation (as a rate of total 
employment) in early-transition Estonia is substantial; in particular, it is larger than job 
creation in the Czech Republic.  However, it occurs on the background of drastic scrapping 
of the old large firms and in presence of minimal unemployment insurance and social 
benefits. We therefore ask if and to what extent some of the Estonian new jobs pay very 
low wages.  
First, in Figure 6 we plot the fraction of employment in the new sector with wages 
below the 20
th percentile of the wage distribution in the whole economy. (Unfortunately, in 
Estonia wage information is usable only since the introduction of the stable Estonian 
currency in late 1992.) We see that this fraction of low-wage jobs is indeed higher in 
Estonia after the peak of job destruction there, reaching almost 22% versus about 18% in 
the Czech Republic in the same year of transition.  In both countries the share is much less 
in the first year and one half of transition and then it seems to level off.  However, Estonia 
                                                                                                                                                    
corresponding JC and JD rates as well as on a set of industry and year fixed effects (we work with 5 degrees 
of freedom). Both job rate coefficients are large and positive (4.44 for the JC rate, and 7.58 for the JD rate) 
suggesting a positive effect on output of both startup of new jobs and scrapping of old jobs. We obtain 
similar effects when using the GDP-per-employee growth rate. However, the estimated coefficients are 
substantially smaller and insignificant when we use 1995 or 1994 data. 
31 It is interesting to note that there was an enormous growth of dollar-denominated wage bills in the sample 
period. The exchange rates were stable in both countries, while in the Czech Republic the local-currency-
denominated nominal wage bill of January 1991 doubled by the end of 1996. The comparable Estonian wage 
bill of January 1993 more than doubled before the end of 1994. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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maintains a share above 20% whereas the Czech Republic’s average share is slightly below 
20%.  
Second, we consider the large difference between replacement ratios of the 
unemployment insurance system in the two countries and ask which Estonian new-sector 
jobs are (at the start of employment) paying less than 60% (the Czech replacement ratio) of 
the wage in the previous employment. This fraction is between 0.05 and 0.06 in 92-95 in 
Estonia as compared to 0.02 to 0.035 in the Czech Republic. Hence, we conclude that 
while there is more low-wage new-sector employment in Estonia compared to the Czech 
Republic, the extent of this phenomenon is surprisingly small given the near absence of 
unemployment insurance during early Estonian transition. The growth in productive new 
jobs in Estonia appears as real as that we see in Czech lands. 
 
4.5 Reallocation and Wages 
Much of the Czech transition reallocation occurred as voluntary worker moves from old to 
new firms (Jurajda and Terrell, 2001), which suggests an important role for new/old wage 
differentials. Our data contain representative information not only on the distribution of 
jobs but also on the corresponding wages (starting late 1992 in Estonia). Comparing the 
relative wage levels in the new to the old sectors in Figure 6 reveals a similar pattern in 
both countries: The average wage in the new sector starts out substantially higher but the 
gap gradually diminishes. 
While the pattern is similar, the ratio of the average wages in the new to the old 
sector is always higher in the Czech transition, consistent with our expectations. The 
voluntary movement (and adequate unemployment benefits) allowed for more job search 
and better job matches in the Czech Republic; alternatively, employers in the Czech new 
sector had to offer higher wages to attract workers from the old jobs, which were slow to 
close down.
32 Munich et al. (2001) look within the Czech Republic and study the wage 
change between 1989 and 1996 for workers employed at both time moments, where wage 
growth is explained by the type of move across new and old sector. They find that, indeed, 
quits give the largest gain – approximately 9 percent higher wages than the average person 
who was laid off.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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While we have intuition for why the wage gap is larger in the Czech Republic, it is 
less clear why the initial wage premium is so large and why it gradually diminishes over 
transition. The first possible explanation for the markup has to do with sectoral differences 
in productive characteristics of workers. Second, the large initial markup can be due to a 
self-selection process where those with high benefits from moving to a startup do so first. 
Alternatively, one can think of this wage markup as a risk premium or as an efficiency 
wage that induces harder work in new jobs. Finally, it may arise from the rent received 
from first-mover advantage (as the new firms entered unfilled niches), which shrank over 
time as more firms entered and competition ensued. Below, we explore some of these 
hypotheses.  
First, we study the gap in simple pooled cross-sectional regressions including a 
dummy for new sector job and controlling for demographic characteristics. The top panel 
of Table 2 shows that conditioning on worker characteristics (and imposing the same wage 
structure in the new and old sector), the OLS new-sector wage premium from transition 
year 1 is almost 50% smaller in both countries when compared to the unconditional 
premium of Figure 7. Still, the initial gap remains economically significant and follows a 
pattern similar to that of Figure 7: declining during transition in both countries. It is also 
the case that the premium is higher in the Czech Republic than in Estonia. Three years into 
transition, the Czech new wage premium is still over ten percent while there is no 
significant difference in Estonian wages across the new and old sectors, after correcting for 
observable worker characteristics.
33  
Second, if workers with larger gains from working in the new sector choose to 
move there, the new-sector dummy is endogenous. One simple way to get at the size of the 
self-selection effect is to instrument the new-sector dummy using a binary indicator for the 
worker having been laid off from the old sector in past.
34 Most of the old-firm layoffs are 
mass layoffs or plant closures where one would expect workers across the entire spectrum 
of unobservables to be laid off. That is: our instrument is valid to the extent that low-
quality workers (conditional on observable characteristics) are not targeted in mass layoffs. 
The 2SLS results should be viewed as a gingerly first-step attack at a complicated issue. 
                                                                                                                                                    
32 New firms in the Castanheira and Rolland (2000) model offer higher wages to pull workers from old firms 
facing soft budget constraint. However, it is not clear why the wage premium should be so large. 
33 In both countries, the OLS gap increases in size if we also condition on firm size. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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The new-sector wage premium based on the IV estimator, which attempts to filter 
out the self-selection part of the premium, implies that at the start of transition there is no 
difference between wages of a randomly selected worker placed in either the new or the 
old sector.
35 Later on in transition, the effect of working in a new firm on wages of a 
randomly selected worker actually becomes negative and large, especially in Estonia. 
Taking the results of this simple IV estimator at face value, once the niches left open by 
central planning are filled, moving a random worker from the old to the new sector has a 
substantial negative effect on wages. Yet, the OLS effects are never negative, suggesting 
that self-selection (moving according to one's comparative advantage) is a powerful force 
of transition reallocation. Self-selection on gains from working in the new sector appears 
as a driving force of wage gains in transition and, to the extent that wages reflect 
productivity, of macroeconomic growth.  
Why does the gap close over time? This could be caused by restructuring and 
productivity gains in the old sector (as in Aghion and Blanchard, 1994) or by competition 
for workers and increased effort in the old sector (as in Roland and Sekkat, 2000). If the 
initial wage premium has to do with self-selectivity, its positive effects evaporate over 
time, especially in Estonia. Alternatively, the risk rent of working for the new sector goes 
away with transition or competition drives niche rents and hence wages down in the new 
sector. 
In Figure 3 we saw a differential growth of the new sector within industries as well 
as differential growth of total industry employment. Below we therefore ask whether those 
differences are reflected in relative wages; we use wage information to shed light on the 
nature of job growth in new small firms across industries. Figure 8 shows the relative 
average wage of the new to the old sector in each industry in both countries. (We drop 
Estonian finance because there were too few wages reported; the wage level appears about 
twice as high in Estonian new-sector finance compared to old-sector.)  
While there are differences across industries, average wage differences between 
new and old sector are apparently not related to the varying share of new jobs within 
industry — the industry-specific wage pattern typically does not diverge much from the 
country average one.  The bottom panel of Table 2 confirms this unconditional view with 
                                                                                                                                                    
34 This indicator is a highly significant predictor of being employed in a new firm. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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OLS new-sector wage effects controlling for workers' productive characteristics. There 
appear to be no systematic differences in the estimated new-job wage effect linked to the 
evolution of industry size or the growth of the new sector within each industry. Instead, 
wages in the new sector are apparently set in comparison to wages in the old sector in the 
same industry, no matter whether that industry is growing or shrinking. This appears 
consistent with the efficiency wage explanation for the new-old wage premium. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
This paper offers stylized facts on the type and sources of start-up job growth in early 
transition using data from two countries. In particular, we identify patterns of this job 
growth in terms of niches left from central planning. Further, we compare job creation 
under two different transition paths: one involving drastic job destruction and high 
unemployment, the other based on gradual scrapping of old firms. Of course, differences or 
similarities in outcomes across our two countries can be due to differences in both policies 
and underlying fundamentals of each economy. While we do not attempt to create 
counterfactual evidence, we believe a careful descriptive analysis of the two different paths 
of transition is useful given the lack of our knowledge of the small new sector growth. 
Given the amount of industrial reallocation needed in transition economies that 
over-employed resources in agriculture and manufacturing, we were surprised to find job 
growth within industries to be quantitatively more important than job growth due to across-
industry reallocation. Furthermore, the industrial composition of startups is strikingly 
similar in the two countries, especially given large differences in capital constraints. We 
offer convergence to "western" industry firm-size distributions as an explanation.  
We also document regularities in wage evolution across new and old firms and 
suggest that the new jobs were significant contributors to output (as reflected by wage 
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level), rather than “stop gap measures” to relieve unemployment. New-sector job creation 
is strongly correlated with GDP growth rates. However, the relationship is weaker in 
Estonia than in the Czech Republic and a slightly larger fraction of jobs are of poorer 
quality (very low wage) in Estonia.  This was expected given the differences in the 
unemployment benefits and access to capital in these two countries. 
There is strong correspondence in the size and trend of the wage gap between the 
new and old sectors in each country.  We expected, and found, a larger wage differential in 
the Czech Republic, where most reallocation was driven by quits. We show that the early-
transition new-old wage differentials remain in both countries after controlling for 
selectivity bias by using mass layoffs as instrument for moving to the new firms. 
Overall, we are struck by the similarities across the two countries in the structure of 
new-to-old reallocation in terms of industries, demographics, or wages. It appears as if the 
difference in macroeconomic policies was mainly manifested in the aggregate level of 
unemployment and wages, but not in the composition of the new sector.  
On the methodological front, our analysis illustrates the usefulness of inexpensive 
household data for studying structural job change. Not only does worker-level data allow 
for estimation of job reallocation patterns, one can also use individual wage information to 
learn about the nature of job reallocation, both at the micro and aggregate levels. 
In future research it would be ideal to combine similar data from a number of 
countries to estimate the effects of various policies on the speed and nature of job 
reallocation and to identify differences in the reallocation patterns with potential 
consequences for long-term growth. The path of early transition may affect long run 
growth through selection among multiple equilibria as in Berkowitz and Cooper (1997) or 
through sclerosis effects from insufficient reallocation as in Caballero and Hammour 
(2000). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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Tables 
 
 
Firm size
Agriculture 
and forestry
Mining 
and 
utilities
Manufact
uring
Constructi
on
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade
Hotel and 
restaurant
Other 
private 
services
Banking 
and 
insurance
<20 65 8 22 35 42 67 55 11
20-100 29 18 25 38 28 23 21 25
101-500 6 28 32 22 20 9 18 33
>500 0 46 22 5 9 2 7 31
< 5 0 8 5 2 12 46 65 8 2 2
50-99 8 9 9 13 13 12
100-499 6 24 27 17 21 31
> 500 1 46 40 4 9 35
< 5 0 5 0 2 34 76 16 7 2 9
50-99 21 9 14 17 14 16
100-499 18 16 27 22 17 40
> 500 11 51 12 0 3 14
<25 9 4 7 23 44 56 25 7
25-100 29 20 14 20 21 19 21 51
101-500 49 26 34 35 25 14 29 23
>500 13 50 45 22 10 10 25 19
< 2 5 2 3 1 21 84 36 76 74 22 2
25-100 31 17 21 24 19 16 21 26
101-500 43 23 29 25 10 11 19 33
>500 3 48 32 8 3 6 18 19
<20 6 4 4 10 20 20 14 0
20-100 6 15 9 21 26 27 20 100
101-500 50 21 28 39 30 32 34 0
>500 37 60 59 30 25 22 32 0
<20 33 9 15 21 54 48 28 13
20-100 19 21 22 37 25 29 25 73
101-500 26 19 26 28 15 17 24 7
>500 22 50 37 13 6 6 23 7
Tab. 1: Industry Firm-size Distribution
Estonia January 1991
Estonia March 1995
22
17
22
14
11
12
50
Czech Republic December 1996
East Germany 1995
West Germany 1995
Austria 1998
Czech Republic January 1991
53William Davidson Institute Working Paper 503 
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Tab. 2: New-job Wage Premium
transition year 1 3 6 1 3
OLS 0.24 * 0.132 * 0.104 * 0.17 * -0.037
(0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.024)
R2 0.29 0.32 0.3 0.11 0.14
IV -0.005 -0.069 -0.173 * -0.025 -0.521 *
(0.118) (0.101) (0.104) (0.081) (0.103)
R2 0.21 0.28 0.2 0.1 0.04
N 2435 2639 2681 3963 3993
OLS in
Agriculture and Forestry 0.24 * -0.069 -0.069 0.122 * -0.046
(0.023) (0.101) (0.101) (0.068) (0.068)
R2 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.06 0.1
N 234 184 147 877 620
Manufacturing, Mining & Util. 0.214 * 0.099 * 0.077 * 0.13 * -0.077 *
(0.051) (0.03) (0.026) (0.046) (0.037)
R2 0.29 0.35 0.34 0.11 0.16
N 1075 1094 1084 1327 1282
Construction 0.2 * 0.151 * 0.104 * 0.105 0.042
(0.058) (0.044) (0.06) (0.071) (0.098)
R2 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.1
N 243 272 263 370 356
Trade 0.2 * 0.2 * 0.066 0.196 * -0.156 *
(0.058) (0.058) (0.054) (0.057) (0.066)
R2 0.31 0.34 0.31 0.16 0.14
N 293 356 413 554 727
Services , Rest. and Hotel 0.288 * 0.162 * 0.119 * 0.114 * -0.063
(0.052) (0.042) (0.042) (0.059) (0.049)
R2 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.13 0.22
N 362 468 481 728 871
Estonia
Notes: *denotes significance at 10% level with robust standard errors. All regressions control for age, 
gender, and education type. Public sector is excluded as well as observations with missing values of 
the regressors. Data taken from January of each year.
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Fig. 1: Aggregate Evolution of Employment and Job Reallocation
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Fig. 2: Job Creation (JC) and Destruction (JD) by Industry
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Fig. 3: Industry Employment Change and Fraction New
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Fig. 4: Demographic Composition of Employment
SHARE of Group on Total Employment and Fraction of NEW by Group
Males
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Fig. 5a: Estonian Industry Growth and JC in 1994 (t=2)
JC rate by industry
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Fig. 5b: Czech Industry Growth and JC in 1993 (t=2)
JC rate by industry
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Fig. 6: % of New Wages<Economy-wide 20th Percentile
years of transition
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Fig. 7: Relative Average Wages
years of transition
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Fig. 8: Relative Average Wages by Industry
transition time
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